Bebchuk in WSJ: ‘An Antidote for the Corporate Poison Pill’


Shareholders could reduce the toxicity of corporate boards’ use of a “poison pill”—a device designed to block shareholders from considering a takeover bid—if they could replace board majorities more quickly, writes Harvard Law School Professor Lucian Bebchuk LL.M. ’80 S.J.D. ’84 in an op-ed that appeared in the Feb. 24, 2011, edition of the Wall Street Journal.

Harvard Law Faculty Lead SSRN Ranking

Harvard Law School’s faculty earned the top ranking for the number of academic papers authored and downloaded on the Social Science Research Network (SSRN), according to cumulative statistics  released for 2010. HLS faculty members captured 10 of the top 100 slots–including the number one slot–among the top 100 law school professors (in all legal areas) in terms of readers’ use of their work.

Bebchuk in Project Syndicate: Pricing corporate governance


In an op-ed for Project Syndicate, “Pricing Corporate Governance,” Harvard Law School Professor Lucian Bebchuk discusses how markets price the corporate-governance provisions of companies. He also details his findings from a recent study “Learning and the Disappearing Association between Governance and Returns”  with HLS Visiting Professor of Law Alma Cohen and HLS Lecturer in Law and Economics Charles C.Y. Wang. Bebchuk is director of the Corporate Governance Program at Harvard Law School. He is co-author, with Holger Spamann, of “Regulating Bankers’ Pay.”

Bebchuk and Fried: Taming the Stock Option Game

Jesse Friedand Lucian Bebchuk

This op-ed by Harvard Law School Professors Lucian Bebchuk LL.M. ’80 S.J.D ’84. and Jesse Fried, entitled “Taming the Stock Option Game,” appeared in the November 2009 edition of Project Syndicate. This article builds on their study “Equity Compensation for Long-term Performance.” Bebchuk and Fried are co-authors of “Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation.”

Bebchuk: Should Bondholders be Bailed Out?


A year after the United States government allowed the investment bank Lehman Brothers to fail but then bailed out AIG, and after governments around the world bailed out many other banks, key question remains: when and how should authorities rescue financial institutions?

Bebchuk and Spamann in NYT: Reducing incentives for risk-taking

Bebchuk and Spamann

This op-ed co-written by Harvard Law School Professor Lucian Bebchuk LL.M. ’80 S.J.D. ’84 and Holger Spamann, “Reducing incentives for risk-taking,” appeared in the October 12, 2009, edition of the New York Times. Bebchuk is a professor of law, economics and finance and director of the Program on Corporate Governance at Harvard Law School, and Spamann is co-executive director and a fellow of the HLS corporate governance program. Their op-ed builds on their joint paper, “Regulating Bankers’ Pay.”